I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Economics at the European University Institute. I am on the Job Market this year and will be available for interview at the ASSA meeting in Chicago and the SAEe meeting in Málaga.
Research Interests:
International Finance, Macroeconomics, Financial Economics
Office Address:
Department of Economics
European University Institute
Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
Florence, 50133, Italy
Contact Information:
Tel. (+39) 331-304-5402
Email: eugenia.andreasen_eui.eu
Education
Job Market Paper: Sovereign Default, Institutions and the External Cost of Capital.
Supervisors: Piero Gottardi and Ramón Marimón.
Professional Experience
Teaching Experience
Awards and Scolarships
Professional Skills
Participation in Academic Conferences
CV Eugenia Andreasen.pdf
Papers:
Job Market Paper
Abstract: Recent empirical studies find a systematic tightening of external financial constraints for the private sector after sovereign defaults. This paper develops a signaling model for a small open economy in which the sovereign debt repayment decision of the government provides new information to international credit markets regarding the institutional quality in the country. Credit markets care about institutional quality because it affects the expected repayment of loans. Therefore, if international investors receive negative information on the institutional quality from the sovereign default they worsen the terms of credit they offer to local firms. The model can rationalize the restricted access to international credit observed after default episodes as the result of the negative information revealed to credit markets.
Joint work with Guido Sandleris and Alejandro Van der Ghote
Abstract: In times of crises, sovereign debt repayment typically depends on the implementation of fiscal programs. In order to implement these programs, governments usually need to garner some political support. If they are unable to do it, a sovereign default usually follows. The literature on sovereign defaults has not paid attention to the presence of political constraints, assuming, instead, that governments have always unlimited access to the resources of the economy to repay their debts. In this paper, we analyze how the presence of political constraints affects sovereign governments' borrowing and default decisions. We do so in a standard DSGE model with endogenous default risk where we introduce two novel features: heterogeneous agents in the domestic private sector and a requirement that the government obtains some of their support to implement a fiscal program needed to repay the debt. In this framework, we show that there can be different types of sovereign default events. Default can arise because the government is unwilling to repay, in the best tradition of the sovereign debt literature, but also due to insufficient political support even if a benevolent government would prefer to repay. We calibrate the model to the Argentine economy and show that once political constraints are taken into account the matching with the data of standard sovereign debt models is weaker than previously understood.
Work in Progress:
Creditor Rights and Corporate Bond Spreads in Times of Financial Instability
Joint work with Patricio Valenzuela
Abstract: Creditor rights are widely recognized as one of the main determinants of credit market development as well as of the terms and the quantity of credit available in a country. While there is a rich literature studying the influence of creditor rights on the cost of debt for the private sector, very little has been done to understand their role during times of financial distress. Using a novel data set on corporate bonds placed on international markets by developed and emerging markets borrowers for the period 2004-2009, this paper comprehensively explores whether the impact of episodes of financial distress on corporate bond spreads is exacerbated in countries with weak creditor rights. Our findings have broad implications for policymakers since they suggest that improving creditor rights can significantly reduce the cost of financial crises through a higher resilience of firms’ cost of capital to episodes of financial turmoil.
Sovereign Default, Institutions and the External Cost of Capital Andreasen Nov2011.pdf
Andreasenetal_Political_Economy_of_Sovereign_Defaults.pdf
Academic References
Gottardi, Piero
Professor of Economics
Email: piero.gottardi_eui.eu
Tel: (+39) 055-468-5919
Marimón, Ramón
Director of the Max Weber Postdoctoral Programme and Professor of Economics
Email: ramon.marimon_eui.eu
Tel: (+39) 055-468-5911.
Sandleris, Guido
Director of the Finance Research Center and Professor of Economics
Business School
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Email: gsandleris_utdt.edu
Tel: (+54) 11-5169-7301
Professional References
Quevedo, Fernando
Country Representative in Costa Rica
Inter-American Development Bank
Email: fernandoq_iadb.org
Tel: (+506) 2523-3300
Ferrari, Aurora
Manager
MSME Finance Service Line
World Bank
Email: aferrari_worldbank.org
Tel: (+1) 202-473-3547
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